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PROBATE LAWS--SOME NEEDED CHANGES
By H. D. HENRY of the Colorado Bar
N a day of streamlined trains, which pick up their passengers at the conclusion of the day's business in Denver
and deposit them in Chicago at the beginning of the
next day's business; in a day of fast airplanes, capable of
completely encircling the globe in a period of less than four
days; of radio, which brings instantaneously, to the remotest
parts of the earth, descriptions of events then happening, or,
within the space of a very few minutes, brings accurate reports of things which have happened, of newspapers which
carry, within a few hours, reports of happenings, even pictures of events which have just occurred thousands of miles
away; in a day when creditors are constantly in touch with
their debtors, know their every movement, and know, within
the space of a few hours, of the death of a debtor; when recluses in the most inaccessible parts of the earth are now
better informed by radios, good roads, newspapers, airplanes
and streamlined trains, of world events than were the back
fence gossips of not so long ago; in a day such as this we, in
Colorado, are operating under probate laws which were designed for the period when it took days and weeks for a
lawyer or judge to traverse the territory between county seats;
during a period when the ox cart was more popular than the
automobile; when communication was slow, and when citizens of this great state might go for months without hearing
any of the news of the outside world.
It must have been a delightful experience to administer
estates in the ox cart days, when an Administrator's chief
duties were to count the cows, make a list of them, sell them,
report the same to the Court and, after the expiration of the
one-year period for filing claims, file final report and be discharged.
Prior to the advent of the inheritance tax, with the
necessity of filing a report to the Inheritance Tax Department,
349
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and subsequently attempting to prove to the Department, in
one or more conferences, the fairness of the executor's valuations; in a time prior to the advent of the Federal estate tax,
with the necessity of filing complicated Federal estate tax returns, computing tax on a complicated scale and having
numerous arguments with numerous Internal Revenue agents,
examiners, technical staff and commissioners, attempting to
convince them of the fairness of the executor's valuations; and
prior to the advent of the Federal income tax law, and its
subsequent changes, which make it necessary for executors to
file such returns in all estates of any size, and have numerous
arguments with various Internal Revenue officials regarding
the correctness of the return and the tax paid; in a day prior
to the advent of the Colorado state income tax law, with the
necessity of filing returns in every estate, of figuring normal
taxes and 2% surtaxes, deductions and exemptions; when an
executor could file an inventory in the County Court, without
standing in mortal fear that the Assessor would eventually
find the inventory, and attempt to tax the $100.00 checking
account of the decedent for ten or fifteen years before, at the
rate of three or four per cent a year, because the decedent had,
following the universal practice of taxpayers, failed to return
such account as a part of his taxable assets; yes, I say, it must
have been a very pleasant experience to administer an estate in
those olden days.
However, we are living in a streamlined age, in an age of
fast communication; in an age of changing conditions and
tremendous responsibilities, and our probate laws should meet
the test of such days, not the test of ox cart days, and, for
that reason, I feel that it is time that our Legislature seriously
undertook the task of streamlining our probate laws.
One thing that needs attention is our statutes regarding
the filing of claims against an estate and setting the normal
administration period. Although, under optional valuation
privileges of the Federal Estate Tax law and the new Colorado
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Inheritance Tax law amendments, the administration period
of large estates cannot be reduced by reducing the time within
which claims can be filed, the period for administering small
and simple estates can be reduced by that method, and executors will be enabled to more quickly determine the financial
status of their estates so that proper and oftentimes much
needed distributions can be made earlier.
I propose a time limit for filing claims of four or six
months. During the past five years, since my admission to the
Bar, virtually all of my work has been the handling of estates
and, naturally, over this period of time I have come in contact with many. To the best of my knowledge, not once in
any of these estates would a period of four or six months have
not been more than sufficient time in which to allow creditors
to file claims. Once in my experience a claim was filed five
days prior to the expiration of the one-year period for filing
claims. The claim was filed by the decedent's landlady, the
first person who knew of his death and who could have filed
a claim within twenty-four hours after the death, if she had
so desired.
There is some question as to whether or not all claims
must be filed within the one-year period. There seems to be
an extensively-held opinion among Denver attorneys that the
one-year period applies only to claims of the fifth class, and
that claims of the other four classes may be filed at any time.
This should certainly be clarified. There is also considerable
doubt as to whether or not contingent claims, or claims which
have not matured, must be filed within the one-year period.
In my opinion, there is no reason why contingent and unmatured claimants cannot file their claims within four or six
months of the decedent's death, providing proper provision is
made for settlement and allowance upon the ripening of the
claim. There is also much question as to what of the various
claim statutes apply to estates of minors and mental incompetents. This matter should also be clarified.
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Adjustment Day is a day of the past. Whatever purpose it might have served in the past, it certainly does not serve
the same purpose at the present time. I propose that an
executor or administrator, upon appointment, run a notice
to creditors, advising them of the appointment, advising them
to file claims and giving the last day upon which claims may
be filed. Such a notice would certainly be sufficient, and
would recognize the passing of the usefulness of Adjustment
Day. Such a notice could be published once a week for four
successive weeks, and could state that claims must be filed
within four or six months from the date of the first publication.
Another difficulty of our present law is that where an
Administrator to Collect is appointed, this appointment does
not start running the time for filing claims, with the result
that, if an Administrator to Collect acts, as he might very
well do, for, say, six months, creditors have actually eighteen
months to file claims. The appointment of an Administrator
to Collect should start running the period for filing claims.
Many minor changes in the claims statutes could be made for
their betterment, but space limits mentioning all of them, and
all statutes which now point to a normal time of administration of one year should be changed to conform to the time as
finally determined by the claim statutes for filing claims.
The statute concerning administration of estates under
$300.00, although very wise in its goal, probably needs some
attention in order to make it absolutely valid. Small changes,
such as a provision for giving notice to creditors, might be
added in such a way as to remedy the objections. It has been
suggested, and very properly, that the amount might be increased to, say $500.00.
The statutes relating to probating wills also need attention. In the first place, the time of notice could probably be
very beneficially reduced. I have often wondered why it is
that anyone except the heirs at law should be entitled to notice
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of probate. Under our present practice, we notify all heirs and
all legatees and devisees, and yet the real reason for the notice
is to give persons who would benefit by the will's being denied
probate an opportunity to be heard. Legatees and devisees,
receiving something which they would not receive otherwise, are not in this position. Notice by publication satisfies
the legal requirements and yet, unless a notice is actually sent
to the persons to whom the notice runs, the notice isn't worth
much. My suggestion would be that a copy of the published
notice be sent by ordinary or registered mail to every person
entitled to such notice.
I think, also, that it is time our Legislature considered
the advisability of adopting a statute relating to living probate.
Under such statutes a testator can go before a proper officer,
be examined as to testamentary capacity and other things, and
the will is then lodged, with a proper official, and, upon the
death of the testator, is immediately probated, without notice
to heirs. A statute could probably be drawn, which would
not only effectuate the purpose of living probate but would
also protect the rights of heirs to have an improperly probated
will set aside.
Another division of our laws which needs attention is
that part relating to the powers of executors. When an executor is given, in the decedent's will, broadest possible powers
for conduct of an estate, transfer agents, and many other classes
of people, abrogate those powers by requiring that Court
approval be obtained of the action. In many states, the executor, after probating the will and filing an inventory, if properly
exempted by the will, is relieved from any -further necessity to
report to or account to, or be under the supervision of, the
probate court, and is allowed to conduct the estate free from
the control of the probate court. I do not, at present, advocate
such a procedure in this State, but I do believe that, when a
testator gives an executor full powers, those powers should
not be limited by the Courts unless contrary to public policy,
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and I believe that our statutes should be so clarified as to confirm in executors such powers as are given by the will.
Testamentary Trusts are a fairly new development. The
rapid growth of testamentary trusts caused at one time the
insertion of a provision in our laws that testamentary trustees
should, unless otherwise provided by the testator, remain under jurisdiction of the County Court. The duties, powers
and liabilities of such trustees were set forth in one small
clause, which states that testamentary trustees shall have the
powers, duties and liabilities of executors. Now, a testamentary trustee cannot logically be subject to all of the duties
and liabilities of an executor. There is no reason for giving
notice to creditors; the statutory sale of real estate is clearly
not applicable to the position of a testamentary trustee; there
is no reason for doing numerous things that would be required
of a testamentary trustee under such a provision. For that
reason, I believe, the powers, duties and liabilities of testamentary trustees should be carefully considered and fully set
forth in the statutes. When a testamentary trust is not under
jurisdiction of the Court, there is some question as to what
must be done. May he file an oath and bond, and is he then
relieved from the jurisdiction of the Court, or, does he proceed without filing an oath and bond? It would be good sense
to fully and adequately set forth the exact status of a testamentary trustee.
Many of our various sections, written at different times,
cause conflicts in regard to the various details of similar procedures in different instances; for example, there is the procedure of determination of heirship. There are three separate
provisions under which heirship can be determined. In these
three provisions there are variances relating to notice, relating
to the time in which the petition must be filed; relating to the
time after which the decree may be entered, and other things,
with the result that the poor lawyer must remember three
separate procedures, whereas, with proper correlation, there
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would be the necessity for remembering only one procedure.
Scattered through our probate statutes are various provisions relating to fiduciary bonds. All of these various sections could be eliminated by one simple section, which provided
simply that the executor or administrator must, at all times,
have on file with the Court a bond, sufficient in amount adequately to protect the estate as to all personal property and
the proceeds from the rental or sale of real property which may
come into the executors hands, and that if, at any time, it
appears that the bond is inadequate, it must be made adequate.
It might also be noted that there are many provisions
relating to notices; that most of the provisions are conflicting
and that, of the various notices required by the probate laws,
there are different periods for each kind of notice. There might
be some justification for having some variation between various types of notices, but there is no reason why they should
not be the same in most cases.
The so-called "Statutory Sale of Real Estate" is the
hoodoo of many executors. We are living in a day when real
estate transactions must be made quickly. Both agents and
purchasers wish a sale to be completed within two or three
days of the time the offer is made. Probably most executors
do not start a statutory sale proceeding until an offer is actually received, and it is very difficult for purchasers and agents
to understand why it is necessary for some two months to
elapse while the property is being appraised and while the
court is being petitioned for sale, while notice is being published to non-resident heirs, and the time required for such
notice is running, and then while the order for sale is being
entered by the Court upon testimony of the executor and,
after the sale, it must be confirmed by the Court. I dare say
that when an abstract is submitted to you for an examination,
you make it the first order of business, because,- if you do not,
the prospective purchaser will be calling you, continuously
and excitedly, to know why it can't be rushed right through.
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I live in mortal fear of the day when my phone will
ring, and I will pick it up to hear a conversation something
like this: "Mr. John Doe died this morning. I have a buyer
for his house. Can we close the deal this afternoon?" and
then I must explain that it is necessary for appraisers to be appointed, for the court to be petitioned, for notice to run to
heirs, devisees and legatees, and that, in all probability, the
sale cannot be completed for two months' time. This long
period of time between offer and completion of the sale seems
long and useless to our present day real estate purchasers and
agents who are used to doing business in a period of hours,
not months, and it does seem to me that any procedure which
requires so much time is. not in keeping with our present idea
of speed and fast communication.
These points are, in my opinion, the main points which
need revision, and which will materially assist in the simplification of estate administration. Many other points need
attention, such as the sections providing for the concurrent
jurisdiction of District and County Courts, when the constitution specifically gives this jurisdiction to the County
Court; there is, of course, the section which talks about children and descendants of children of the half-blood, the appearance of which history does not record. There is also the
question of the election and allowance of an insane widow.
In spite of our mandatory law, it would seem that an insane
widow may, without a Conservator, have the right of election
after the six months' period may have expired. This should
be clarified in such a manner that the widow would adequately
be protected and yet that the right of election would not exist
forever.
Of the present 255 sections of Chapter 176, very likely
most of them need attention, but someone must start now and
-campaign vigorously and continuously until such changes are
adopted as will enable the executor or administrator to administer an estate from the technical standpoint as simply as
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possible. Problems of investments, taxation and the increasing number and complication of reports necessary to be made,
disposition of the assets and settlement with the heirs and
beneficiaries, are so great that the executor or administrator
should be given as much relief as possible from unnecessary
and burdensome details of administration.
Colorado has not shown itself adverse to advisable
changes in either substantive law or rules of procedure. Kansas
and other states have recently revised their probate laws, bringing them up to date. Louisiana has adopted a new Trust
Estates Act, embodying many very desirable features. With
this spirit of change so widely manifested, the Colorado Probate Code should receive early attention.

Repealing Obsolete Laws
The Illinois Legislature recently inaugurated a campaign to remove
obsolete legislation from their statute books, with the result that there
was achieved the mass repeal of 402 acts and parts of acts that had long
outlived their usefulness.
Many of the laws repealed were old validating acts and appropriation measures, others outlived by the advance of time and the progress
of civilization, and some related to the Chicago Sanitary district, state
parks, state institutions, railroads, taxes, highways, and public health.
The search for these obsolete laws was not without some humor.
One act repealed was passed in 1897 and prohibited "long continued
and brutal bicycle riding." Another prohibited "fraud in the sale of
lard," and an act to prevent "the sale of renovated butter" was found.
Apparently the oldest of the bills repealed was "an act to afford relief
to total abstinence societies" which was enacted in this state on May
20, 1879.
Of more pertinent concern were the act to prohibit "false advertising in the purchase of Liberty bonds," other measures providing "relief
to Illinois flood sufferers," and penalties against "nuisances at the World's
Fair." One act was found making it a misdemeanor "to sell or give away
toy pistols," and another act purported "to secure all persons freedom
in the selection of an occupation, profession or employment."
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This statute housecleaning process was accomplished by Senate
Bills 375 and 435, the first measures of their kind to be introduced in
the Illinois legislature since 1874. The Statutes of Illinois in 1819
were contained in a volume of 375 pages: when these repealing acts were
introduced by Senator Hickman, the volume had grown to 3,743 pages.
The removal of these 402 useless and obsolete acts is expected to effect
a material reduction in the size of the Illinois Revised Statutes and thus
assist the active law practitioner who must make constant use of the
volume. "Illinois Bar Journal, Sept., 1919."
Colorado could well afford to have a committee of the next legislature with a similar end in view.

Discrimination in Respect to "Hire"
The National Labor Relations Board recently ordered an employer
to give "back pay" to two union members who had never been employed
by the company. The basis of the Board's holding was that the employer, in failing to hire these men, had discriminated against them in
respect to their hire and had thus discouraged union membership. The
period of "back pay" ran for more than two years, since the men applied
for work in July, -1937. The Board overruled the employer's contention
that the refusal to employ these men was also due to their lack of experience on the particular machines to be used, the advanced age of the
applicants, and the fact that they already were employed elsewhere. The
employer also argued that there were several applicants for each position
available at the time. (In re Waumbec Mills, Inc., 15 NLRB, No. 4,
Sept. 1, 1939.) (N. Y. State Bar Assn., Lawyer Service Letter Oct.
18, 1939.)

NEGLIGENCE
HOLC Not Immune
The Court of Appeals has affirmed the order in the Gillen case
(digested supra, p. 117) holding that when the HOLC owns, manages,
and leases real property it engages in a proprietary function and is therefore not immune in tort for damage claims arising out of a tenant's personal injuries. (Gillen v.HOLC, Ct. of App., May 16, 1939.) Accord, Keifer & Keifer tv. RFC, 59 S. Ct. 516. (N. Y. State Bar Ass'n
Letter, May, 1939.)
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PRESIDENT APPOINTS STANDING COMMITTEES
FOR STATE BAR

W

M. R. KELLY of Greeley, President of the Colorado
Bar Association, announces with this issue of Dicta
the appointment of all standing committees of the
Association. The appointments are made in accordance with
the recent amendments to the by-laws adopted in the 1939
annual meeting.

These amendments provide that each affiliated association
designates ten members for each representative on the Board
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of Governors as eligible for committee membership. From
those so designated, the president selects all the standing committees. Each standing committee is composed of five members except the committee on judicial procedure. This committee according to the by-laws is composed of four district
court judges, two county court judges, and a representative
from each affiliated association not represented by a judge.
The membership is divided into active members who carry
on the bulk of the committees work, and the remaining members act in an advisory and liaison capacity.
In order to establish continuity of committee work a
portion of those designated serve for two years. In the list
of committee appointments which follow the figure "two"
after a name means that that member serves until 1941.

The Colorado Bar Association Standing
Committees 1939-1940
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
William R. Kelly, Greeley, Chairman
George M. Corlett, Vonte Vista
S. Arthur Henry, Denver (2)
Charles M. Holmes, Grand Junction (2)

William E. Hutton, Denver
Leon H. Snyder, Colorado Springs
Fred W. Stover, Fort Collins

MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE
Charles W. Sheldon, Jr., Denver,
Chairman (2)
Frank D. Allen, Akron

Paul L. Littler, Montrose (2)
Raphael J. Moses, Alamosa
John W. O'Hagan, Greeley

GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
Dudley I. Hutchinson, Boulder, Chairman
George A. Epperson, Fort Morgan
Benjamin F. Koperlik, Pueblo

Robert G. Porter, Gunnison (2)
Benjamin E. Sweet, Denver (2)

LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE
Clyde C. Dawson, Jr., Denver, Chairman
Donald T. Horn, Lamar
Charles T. Ribar, Pueblo (2)

E. M. Sherman, Montrose
E. Tyndall Snyder, Greeley (2)
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LEGAL BIOGRAPHY COMMITTEE
J. W. Preston, Pueblo, Chairman (2)
Herman E. Crist, Fort Lupton (2)
Millard Fairlamb, Delta

Percy S. Morris, Denver
Thomas J. Warren, Fort Collins

LOCAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS COMMITTEE
Albert J. Gould, Denver, Chairman (2)
Hatfield Chilson, Loveland (2)
C. J. Gobble, Brighton

E. Ellison Hatfield, Durango
M. E. H. Smith, Greeley

JUDICIAL PROCEDURE COMMITTEE

Active:

Affiliated association representatives:

Claude C. Coffin, Fort Collins, Chairman
John R. Clark, Glenwood Springs (2)
James L. Cooper, Canon City
H. Lawrence Hinkley, Sterling (2)
C. Edgar Kettering, Denver
Harry Leddy, Pueblo (2)

Herman A. Bailey, Las Animas
George H. Bradfield, Greeley
William 0. DeSouchet, Boulder
E. L. Dutcher, Gunnison
Paul S. Fries, Colorado Springs
William W. Gaunt, Brighton
William L. Gobin, Rocky Ford
Straud M. Logan, Grand Junction
John I. Palmer, Saguache

LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS COMMITTEE
Roy W. Foard, Colorado Springs,
Chairman (2)
John T. Barbrick, Pueblo

Howard T. Roepnack, Denver
Charles M. Rolfson, Julesburg
Robert G. Smith, Greeley (2)

UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND LEGISLATION COMMITTEE
Charles H. Queary, Denver, Chairman
Clyde H. Babcock, Colorado Springs
John W. Henderson, Greeley

Roy T. Johnson, Sterling (2)
Sam Parlapiano, Pueblo (2)

AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP COMMITTEE
D. K. Wolfe. Jr., Denver, Chairman (2)
Kent L. Eldred, Canon City (2)
Gail L. Ireland, Denver

Charles J. Moynihan, Montrose
Alfred Todd, Lamar
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W. Scott Carroll
W. Scott Carroll died of a heart attack at Pagosa Springs, Colorado,
on Sunday morning, September 17, 1939, the day after his 58th
birthday.
Mr. Carroll was born on September 16, 1881, and received his
early education in the Salida, Colorado, schools.
He was graduated from the Colorado University Law School in
1906 and was an associate for three years with the Denver law firm of
Goudy, Twitchell and Burkhardt.
He came to the San Luis Valley in 1912 and practiced at Del Norte,
Colorado, until his death. He was County Attorney of Rio Grande
County for many years and was known and respected as one of the
great trial lawyers of his community.
He was kind hearted to a degree, a great lover of children and an
earnest advocate of their interests in the juvenile courts. He was always
kindly and courteous to his fellow lawyers and especially to his adversaries in the court room.
The San Luis Valley and Colorado Bars have lost one of their
outstanding members. At the time of his death he was president of
the San Luis Valley Bar Association.
Surviving him are his widow of Del Norte, Colorado; his son,
John, an instructor at the New Mexico Military Institute, and his
daughter, Betty, of Meeker, Colorado, who is county nurse for'Garfield County.
-Frank

Burris.

The Committee on Placements of the Colorado Junior
Bar Conference
By MARK H. HARRINGTON, Chairman

AT

the annual meeting of the Colorado Junior Bar Con1A ference held on September 22 and 23, 1939, in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Colorado
Bar Association, it was recommended by the Conference's
Committee on Program Suggestions that a new function be
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added to the program of the Conference by the establishment
of a Committee on Placements.
Since the birth of the Conference a year ago, numerous
requests were received from the younger attorneys of the state
for aid in obtaining suitable office connections, and for advice
with respect to locations where conditions would be favorable
to the commencement of an independent law practice. This
was not surprising in view of the status of the Conference as
the state's first organization composed of younger attorneys
and its announced purpose to assist the younger lawyers of
the state, while at the same time giving attention to those
problems of the bar associations which peculiarly affected the
careers of their younger members. Peculiarly enough, following the organization of the Conference, and probably because
of that fact, requests were soon received from both individual
attorneys and established law firms for information with
respect to the identities, training, character, ability, and experience of men available for positions.
The conclusion was finally reached that there is a need
among the bar of this state for the services of a placement
bureau inasmuch as it appears that neither the newly admitted
members of the bar seeking their first positions nor the young
attorneys of a few years' practice seeking new connections
know where to go to seek positions, and the established firms
do not know what men are available when vacancies occur.
This committee has been created to fill this need. It will
function as a central clearing house for those interested in
finding new positions and for those interested in finding the
right men to fill them. All persons in the former category
are invited to list their qualifications with the committee with
the assurance that all information disclosed, including the
initial fact of listing, will be treated in the strictest confidence.
It will be disclosed only to those attorneys seeking new associates, and even then only on the understanding that information so obtained is not to be divulged to other persons. In
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turn, these attorneys, or law firms, may seek the assistance of
the committee with the knowledge that the committee will
not disclose the fact that a vacancy exists in that particular
office. This is essential to a successful operation by the committee inasmuch as most law offices prefer to keep this fact
secret in order to avoid an avalanche of applicants.
Every effort will be made to make the work of the Committee on Placements of real value. It is believed that the
committee will assist not only the lawyer just admitted to
the bar, but also the young lawyer who has practiced a few
years and desires to make a change, and, more particularly,
established offices which frequently find difficulty in obtaining
men who satisfactorily meet their needs because of the impossibility of knowing the names and qualifications of the
men available.
The success of the Committee's efforts will depend in
large degree upon the use made of its facilities. Consequently,
members of the bar are urged to avail themselves of the Committee's services. No charges of any kind will be made, and
the records of the Committee will be kept at the office of the
Chairman at 1020 First National Bank Building, Denver.

LAW LIBRARIES FOR SALE
NOTE: This column is open to members of the Association without charge for listings.
Please communicate with the Secretary if you desire a listing.

Clifford W. Mills of 524 Kittredge Building, Denver,
is offering for sale the J. Warner Mills Law Library of some
seven to eight thousand volumes. This library includes the
Colorado -Reports, the complete reporter system, American
Digest, L. R. A., American and English Reports, Corpus
Juris, A. L. R., and numerous text books. It is his desire to
sell the library intact, but he will welcome inquiries.
Mrs. Fred Y. Holland of 2609 Bellaire Street, Denver,
has a large number of miscellaneous law books which she
desires to sell. She owns several volumes of rare books.
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Wilbur F. Denious, past president of the Colorado Bar
Association, was married to Mrs. Sherman P. Saunders on
September 25, 1939. The marriage occurred the Monday
following the state bar meeting. The newly-weds will return
to Denver about the middle of December.

San Luis Valley Bar Meets
The San Luis Valley Bar Association met at Alamosa
on October 7. Claude W. Corlett, who succeeded to the
presidency upon the death of W. Scott Carroll, the former
president, presided. John Ira Green of Antonito was elected
vice-president to succeed Corlett.
Robert R. Tarbell of Saguache, newly elected vice-president of the State Bar Association reported on the recent State
Bar meeting at Colorado Springs, as did several other members
of the local association.
Quite a heated discussion was had as to the advisability
of asking the court to enter a final decree of divorce. It was
decided that the practice of obtaining a certificate from the
clerk to the effect that no motion or petition was filed, is the
better practice and that this should be the procedure in the
future here in the San Luis Valley, in order that the practice
E. Pound, Correspondent.
--.
be uniform.

Win. R. Kelly has been appointed by the American Bar
Association on its Committee to Develop Legal Institutes.
He is assigned to the states of Colorado, Wyoming, Utah,
New Mexico and Nebraska. On October 19th, he appeared
before the meeting of the Wyoming Bar Association at Cheyenne and urged the establishment of legal institutes within
the state. Interest is being shown by the Wyoming Bar in
legal institutes and it is expected that institutes will be developed there sometime this winter.

PLEADING-DEMURRER-COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AGAINST CITY
OFFICIALS FOR DEATH OF PRISONER-People v. Guthner-No.

14574-Decided September 18, 1939-DistrictCourt of Denver
-Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge-Affirmed in part and reversed
in part.
FACTS: Action brought by the people on the relation of Coover
against named officials of Denver and their bondsmen to recover damages
for the death of son of Coover, occurring while he was confined in the
city jail, and occasioned, as it is alleged, by the wrongful, unlawful and
wanton conduct of said officials. The amended complaint charged the
sheriff personally with the alleged wrongs. The trial court sustained a
demurrer to the complaint.
HELD:
1. The amended complaint charging the sheriff personally with the alleged wrongs is not vulnerable to a general demurrer, and
he should be required to answer.
2. The judgment as to the warden and his bondsman is affirmed,
but as to the other defendants it is reversed.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. EN BANC.

MOTION TO QUASH SUMMONS-AGENCY-SERVICE OF PROCESS ON
FOREIGN CORPORATION--Junior Frocks, Inc. v. District Court of
Denver and Joseph J. Walsh as District Judge-No. 14256-Decided September 11, 1939-Originalproceeding. Writ of prohibition granted.
FACTS: A. Petitioner, a corporation of Missouri, sued out a writ
of certiorari, or prohibition in the Supreme Court against the District
Court of Denver and Hon. Joseph J. Walsh as judge thereof on the
ground that the District Court erroneously overruled a motion to quash
a certain summons issued in a case in which one V was plaintiff.
B. Petitioner's affidavits in support of its motion to quash, as
uncontradicted, show that the summons was served on one A, that the
auto driven by him (and which allegedly caused the accident, injuring
V) was driven by A, belonged to him personally, that the petitioner
neither owned any interest in it nor operated or in any way controlled
it or attempted to interfere with or direct the operation, or even suggested
the use, or the manner of the use, of it, or required A to provide any
motor transportation, etc., so that the relation of principal and agent
could not have existed in the running of the car, or rendered the petitioner responsible for the collision.
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HELD: 1. The facts negative any liability on the part of the petitioner and the motion to quash should have been sustained.
2. Where it appears that A, the driver of the car, was an independent, itinerant solicitor of sales, in numerous states, of merchandise
manufactured by petitioner and by' other manufacturers, that he had no
established place of business, that he solicited orders from merchants with
the aid of samples, that he merely obtained orders which he sent by mail
to petitioner, that the latter accepted or rejected them and assumed all
credit responsibility as to those accepted, that it paid A 72 '% of purchase price of accepted orders as a commission, that A paid all his own
expenses, chose his own method of transportation, that the goods on
accepted orders were shipped from outside Colorado, etc., A was .not the
agent of the petitioner so as to permit service of process on the petitioner

by serving A.
3. Interstate business which consists of or results from the mere
solicitation of orders from prospective purchasers cannot lawfully be
interfered with by a state.
4. The petitioner was not engaged in business in Colorado to the
extent that it was subjected to the local jurisdiction for the purpose of
service of process upon it.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bock and Mr. Justice Burke not participating.

CRIMINAL LAW--STATUTORY RAPE-KNOWLEDGE OF AGE-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR-COMMON LAW MARRIAGE-Efseuer v. People
-No.
14378-Decided September 18, 1939-District Court of
Denver-Hon. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. One who has sexual intercourse with girl under 18 at
the time of the act charged is guilty whether he did or did not know that
she was under the statutory age of consent, unless they were then and
there husband and wife.
2. Motion for directed verdict of not guilty on ground that defendant and prosecuting witness were man and wife, properly overruled
where there is no competent evidence in record that a common law marriage existed at the time of the act.
3.
The Supreme Court will not of its own motion exercise its
discretionary power to consider errors, not properly assigned, where the
record reveals that the defendant has unconditionally admitted the act
which constitutes the crime for which he was convicted.
4. The admission of evidence brought out by counsel for plaintiff in error on cross-examination cannot later be used as a ground for
reversal.
5.
Conduct of defendant in procuring is inconsistent with the
bona fide intent required to constitute common law marriage.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Bock dissenting. EN BANC.
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ARBITRATION-AWARD--SUIT

TO SET SAME ASIDE-Twin Lakes

Reservoir and Canal Co. v. Platt Rogers, Inc.-No. 14323-Decided September 25, 1939-District Court of Pueblo CountyHon. Harry Leddy, Judge-Reversed with instructions.
FACTS: In a dispute upon a contract between the parties, the matters were submitted to the arbitrators and judgment entered in the District Court upon their awards. The plaintiff herein then instituted in
the District Court the instant matter for the purpose of setting aside and
vacating the award and the judgment rendered thereon. The court sustained a demurrer to the complaint.
HELD:
1. Where it appears that the board of arbitrators failed
to give reasonable notice in writing of the time and place their hearings
were to be held, and where it appears that each of the parties was not
given reasonable opportunity to promptly present to such board the evidence it desires to offer in support of its position with reference to claims
of defendant, such conduct on the part of the board affords a sufficient
ground for setting aside the award.
2.
Although the arbitration agreement provides that the arbitrators shall have power to make such independent investigation of the matters in controversy as to them may seem necessary in order to arrive at a
correct solution of the matter, no authority is thereby conferred upon
them to adopt the conclusions of outsiders who may be consulted, without a considered determination of their own upon the information so
obtained. They may not delegate their powers.
3.
Awards, even though valid on their faces, may be set aside in
equity for misconduct on the part of the arbitrators, and extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove such misconduct. The demurrer is to be
overruled.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bock and Mr. Justice
Burke not participating. EN BANC.

TEACHER'S CONTRACT - CONDITION PRECEDENT - LICENSING SCHOOL DISTRICTS-STATUTES-Union High School District v.
Paul-No. 14438-DecidedSeptember 25, 1939-DistrictCourt,
Prowers County-Hon. John L. East, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Suit on teacher's contract to recover salary. Defense asserts
that teacher (plaintiff) was not properly licensed, although she had letter
signed by President and Secretary of High School District granting her
the "privilege to teach the commercial courses in our high school for three
The trial court directed a verdict for plaintiff.
years, * * *."
1. Under Sec. 219, Chap. 146, '35 C. S. A. the law
HELD:
requires the proper licensing of a teacher as a condition precedent to
teaching and recovery of salary for such services.
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2. A contract employing a teacher who does not possess a valid
license is void ab initio.
3.
The Union High School Board did not have the authority to
grant a teaching license.
4. The governing body of a school district has in general only
such powers as are expressly conferred upon it by constitutional or
statutory provisions, or powers which are incidental to those expressly
conferred.
5.
"Statutes conferring powers or investing duties must be strictly
construed and must be treated, not merely as grants of powers, but also
as limitations thereon."
6. Where a new board takes over the duties of the predecessor
board in operation of a "continuing pre-existing district," the new board
might have the power to issue licenses, if the old board had it; but where
a new and distinct entity is created, it does not have, by implication or
otherwise, the powers of the component pre-existing districts included
within its boundaries which, after the formation of the union district,
still continued to exercise their integral functions under the management
of their respective district boards.
7. The existence of the power in the union district to license
teachers may not be implied from the circumstance that it provided vocational instruction in its high school.
8. A school district may not by ratification legally accomplish
a result which it could not bring about by its direct action in the first
instance.
9. The protection of a statute requiring discharge of teacher only
upon good cause shown after a specific charge and opportunity to be
heard thereon before the school board is available only to a duly licensed
teacher.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice
Bakke concur.
NEGLIGENCE - PERSONAL INJURIES - AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT EVIDENCE - WITNESSES - JURORS - VERDICT-Ison et al. v.

Stewart - No. 14430 - Decided September 25, 1939 - District
Court of Denver-Hon. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Suit for damages, brought by S., driver of car against K.
and I., the latter as agent of and driver of truck for K., resulting from
collision between car and truck.
HELD: 1. It is proper to permit mechanics, who have had years
of' experience in repairing wrecked automobiles, who have had full
opportunity to make inspection, and who are acquainted with the con-
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ditions resulting from an auto accident, to give in evidence their opinions
of what occurred at the time of the collision.
2. The unauthorized viewing of the premises by members of
the jury has been held in some jurisdictions as grounds for a new trial,
but the rule must be given a reasonable operation and not be applied
where there is only a possibility that the result was influenced by the
alleged misconduct.
3. The case is not one justifying an exception to the general rule
that affidavits of jurors are inadmissible to impeach their verdicts.
4. Admitting the possibility that newly discovered evidence
would have impeached a witness, where his evidence is merely corroborative, and where there is no probability that it would have changed the
result of a trial, and where there is no showing of diligence on the part
of the defendants in discovering this evidence, the Supreme Court cannot
believe defeandants were prejudiced by refusal of trial court to grant new
trial on such ground.
5. There was no error in court's refusal to separate the causes of
action because I. was the servant and K. the employer. "The relationship being admitted, the inclusion of I. as a defendant in the only substantial cause of action arising out of the accident, if error, was entirely
harmless."
6. Instructions examined and found to contain no error.
7. Where suit is brought for $15,000.00 damages, and actual
damages proven amount to $2,600.00, a verdict for $5,000.00, including about $2,400.00 for damages for pain and suffering is clearly reasonable, and affords no basis for a charge of passion and prejudice on part of
the jury.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Burke concur.

BLIND PENSION-JURISDICTION-MANDAMUS--Colorado Public Wel-

fare Board v. Viles-No. 1459 1-Decided October 2, 1939-District Court of Denver-Hon.George F. Dunklee, Judge-Reversed
in part.
FACTS: Plaintiff brought mandamus to compel Board to allow
him pension because of blindness. An alternative writ was issued and
Board demurred on ground that court had no jurisdiction of "person
of respondent or the subject of the action."
Demurrer overruled and
Board stands.
HELD:
1. Mandamus is the proper remedy "to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office."
2.
The District Court, under its general jurisdiction, may review
the acts of any board or commission where it is contended that legal
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rights have been denied, or that such body is vested with a discretion
which it refuses to exercise.
3. The refusal of the board to exercise discretion neither vested
the court with the discretion nor entitled plaintiff to maximum allowance. The mandate of the court should have been to act, and the court
should not have attempted to set the amount of the allowance.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REVIEW OF COMMISSION'S AWARD-

Condon, et al. v. Williams-No. 14624-DecidedOctober 2, 1939
-District Court of Gunnison County-Hon. George W. Bruce,
Judge-Reversed.
HELD: 1. A direct review of Industrial Commission's award may
not be had by an action instituted in the district court; under Section
377, Chapter 97, 1935, C. S. A., unless there is application to the commission for review of its own award, predicate for judicial review is
lacking.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Bakke and
Mr. Justice Burke, concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
PROMISSORY NOTE-APPEAL AND ERROR-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-

CREDITS-Viles, et al. v. Jackson, etc.-No. 14644-Decided
October 2, 1939--County Court of Denver-Hon. E. J. Ingram,
Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
1. Litigants may not properly be precluded from submitting a draft of bill of exceptions of their own production, but they
proceed so at no little risk.
2. Where litigants do not let court reporter prepare bill of exceptions, and prepare their own, and the trial court refuses to allow
and sign the bill, they must follow Section 420, Code of Civil Procedure, strictly; and the affidavit of one that the bill "is true and correct,
in substance, as to my testimony given at the trial," is not sufficient,
without stating that he was present when the exceptions were taken.
3.
Where in a suit on a promissory note, a defense is raised to
the effect that in an earlier proceeding-replevin to recover possession
of chattels mortgaged to secure the note-the verified complaint stated
the value of the chattels to be $750.00, the defendants may not insist
upon having credit for such sum on the note in the absence of evidence
as to the value of the goods. "Only on evidence as to the value of
chattels taken in replevin, is there basis for judgment."
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Bakke and
Mr. Justice Burke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
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QUIET TITLE-TAXES-PRIORITY-STARE DECISIS -

PLEADING

-

TAX TITLES-Fishel v. City and County of Denver-No. 14391
-Decided October 9, 1939-District Court of Denver-Hon.
George F. Dunlee, Judge-Reversed.
HELD: 1. Where motion for judgment on the pleadings is made,
all material allegations of complaint and replication, properly pleaded,
must be accepted as true.
2.
A tax deed is not necessarily prematurely issued merely because
less than 3 years and 3 months intervene between date of plaintiff's
certificate and that of his tax deed.
3.
The Supreme Court has previously construed Section 3,
Chapter 142, Vol. 4, 1935 C. S. A., page 712, and has held that a lien
created by a sale for general taxes was superior to that of special taxes
for earlier dates.
4.
The defense of the City to the quiet title suit based on tax
deed for General taxes, on the ground that it had prior liens for special
improvement taxes is not good.
ing.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
EN BANC.

Mr. Justice Bouck not participat-

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-AGENCY-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR-CASUAL EMPLOYMENT-Whitney, et at. v. Mountain
States Motors Co.-No. 14629-Decided October 9, 1939District Court of Denver-Hon. Floyd F. Miles, Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. "Whether or not one is an employee (under Section
288 (b), Chapter 97, 1935 C. S. A.) is a question of fact to be determined by the commission. * * * If, however, there is no evidence to support the finding of the commission that claimant was an
employee, it becomes a matter of law, for judicial determination."
2. Evidence considered and found to be sufficient upon which
commission could make reasonable inference that contract hiring claimant was one of employment, contemplating only labor on the job, and
nothing else.
3.
The company's contention, that even if claimant is an employee, nevertheless his employment was but casual and not in the
usual course of the business of the company, is not tenable-the law on
this point has been settled adversely to company's contention.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Bouck concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
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PERSONAL INJURIES-HOTEL KEEPERS-EVIDENCE-CUSTOM-RES

IPSO LOQUITUR-Rudolph, et al. u. Elder-No. 14313-Decided

October 9, 1939-District Court of Denuer-Hon. George F.
Dunklee, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Trial by jury resulted in a recovery of judgment against
defendants in sum of $2,439.28 as damages for personal injuries resulting from negligence of defendants. Defendants were lessees and operators of hotel. Plaintiff sustained injuries when she fell into a freight
elevator shaft adjacent to rear entryway to the hotel.
HELD: 1. It is a hotel keeper's duty to keep his premises reasonably safe for the use of his patrons, and that extends to all portions of
the premises to which a guest might reasonably be expected to go.
2. It was a question of fact for the jury to determine whether
the defendants might have reasonably expected plaintiff, as a guest of the
hotel, to use the rear entryway.
3. Evidence that rear passageway had been regularly and freely
used by guests of the hotel for some years in going to and from the
garage, is admissible to show custom and practice from which it well
could be inferred that defendants might reasonably expect other guests
to so use this portion of the hotel.
4. An invitation to a customer or patron to go to certain parts
of business premises may arise by implication from a known customary
use; and a " 'business invitation includes an invitation to use such part
of the premises as the visitor reasonably believes are held open to him as
a means of access to or egress from the place where his business is to be
transacted'."
5. The jury by its verdict for plaintiffs concluded that within
the rear passageway the legal relationship of the defendants and plaintiff
was that of a hotel keeper and guest. "As a result of this relation the defendants would be liable for any bodily injury suffered by her as a
result of defects in the hotel premises known to them or which in the
exercise of reasonable care they could discover."
6. It is apparent that the automatic lock on the door to the shaft
did not operate at the time of the injury. " 'The owner of the elevator must account for the results of all defects which he might have
discovered by due inspection and investigation, but which he failed to
discover and repair'."
7. "Under the doctrine of res ipso loquitur proof of the fact that
an accident resulted from a defect in a mechanical device within the control of the defendants and which could not have occurred but for such
defect, raises a presumption of negligence sufficient to require the submission of the case to the jury."
8.

" '

*

*

*

Where facts are disputed or inferences there-

from are reasonably disputable,' the question of contributory negligence
is for the jury."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Young concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
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REAL ESTATE-DEEDS-COVENANTS

AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES-

Wheeler v. Roby-No. 14376-Decided October 9, 1939-District Court of Pueblo County-Hon. Harry Leddy, JudgeAffirmed.
HELD:
1. A covenant against encumbrances runs with the land
and inures to subsequent purchasers.
2. Where purchaser of property by deed covenanting against encumbrances including taxes, has to pay taxes, he may sue grantor of
deed, and recover; and this is so although grantee conveyed property to a
third party and then re-took title, since he had it at the time of suit and
at the time the taxes in question were paid.
3. Defendant in counter-claim contended for $1,650.00.
He
claimed the property that he got from plaintiff in the exchange was
supposed to have been fenced and that only about 5,000 of 18,000
acres was actually fenced. The claim was properly dismissed for it was
so indefinite and uncertain that without resort to speculation it would
have been impossible for the court to have determined the amount
claimed, or any other amount that would have had any reasonable
basis of support in the testimony.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Knous and Mr.
Justice Bakke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.

CRIMINAL LAW-CAUSING DEATH OF PERSON WHILE DRIVING
MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING
LIQUOR-INSTRUCTIONS-Rinehart v. People-No. 14478-De-

cided October 9, 1939-DistrictCourt of Adams County-Hon.
H. E. Munson, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Supreme Court will not interfere with verdict of jury
where there is ample evidence to sustain it. The jury is the judge of
the credibility of the witnesses and is to determine the weight of the testimony.
2. Instructions given considered together and found to contain
the law.
3.
In a criminal action for causing death while driving a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, it is proper to
give the following instruction:
"The court instructs the jury that when a driver is so under the
influence of intoxicating liquor that his capacity to operate an automobile is impaired, he is intoxicated within the meaning of the law."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Bock dissent. EN BANC.
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WITH USE OF PREMISES USED FOR

OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION-Mountain States Oil Corporationv.
Sandoval-No. 14636-DecidedOctober 9, 1939-DistrictCourt
of Las Animas County-Hon. David M. Ralston, JudgeAffirmed.
HELD: 1. Under evidence in case, it appears that no injunctive
remedy is desirable, and that only an accounting is advisable. Evidence
examined in light of referee's findings and court's decree and no reversible error found.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Young and
Mr. Justice Knous concur. IN DEPARTMENT.

CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER COLORADO'S UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSALAWTION ACT-INSURANCE AGENTS-CONSTITUTIONAL

Equitable Life Insurance Company v. Industrial CommissionNo. 14515-Decided October 16, 1939-DistrictCourt of Denver
-Hon. Henry A. Hicks, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The controversy raises the question of whether or not
a life insurance company is required to make contributions under the
Colorado compensation act (S. L. '36, 3rd Ex. Sess., c. 2, '35 C. S. A.,
'37 Supp., c. 167A), as amended, with respect to compensation payable
to general, district, special and soliciting agents. Trial Court entered
judgment in favor of the commission for contribution by the insurance
company under the act. The insurance company seeks to reverse such
judgment.
HELD:
1. This case is controlled by the case of Industrial Commission v. North Western Mutual Life Insurance Co., 103 Colo. 550,
88 p. (2d) 560.
2. The insurance company raises the question of the validity of
the application of the act to its agents under the due-process and equalprotection clauses of the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
Such Constitutional questions are not controlling in this case, since they
are based solely upon the premise that the agents of the insurance company are independent contractors and bear no relation to the insurance
company as servants. Under the act as construed in the Northwestern
Mutual Life Insurance case, supra, the activities of the company's agents
are within the legislative definition of "employment".
3.
In view of the fact that the contracts of employment between
company and agent called for the exclusive service of the agent or for
a fixed portion of his time and efforts, for continuous employment, and
not for a specific piece of work, and in view of the fact that the company determines who may assist, and who shall supervise, the activities
of the agent, and the company controls the agent's offices, and the con-
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tracts are not assignable by the agents, and call for their personal performance of service, it is unnecessary to determine the constitutional
questions raised.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Burke specially concurring. EN BANC.
SALARY FOR STATE DIRECTOR OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING-STATU-

TORY CONSTRUCTION-Bedford, etc. v. People, ex rel. TiemannNo. 14451 -Decided October 16, 1939-DistrictCourt of Denver
-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: A. T was employed by the State Board for vocational
education as State Director. The Board fixed his salary at $4,500.00
per annum, and directed that $3,600.00 be paid out of a particular
legislative appropriation; and issued its vouchers accordingly. The
auditor refused to issue warrants for the vouchers. T brought mandamus and the auditor demurred. The lower court overruled the demurrer.
B. The federal government contributed funds for the work of
the board and the latter had full discretion in their expenditure. Sec. 4,
Chapter 264, S. L. 1937, empowers board to fix salary of T. Chapter 53, S. L. 1937 makes an appropriation for $3,600.00 annually for
the Director. "(Less any amount received from the federal government
or agencies, it being the intention that the total salary of said director
shall not exceed $4,000.00 per year.)"
Both chapters were approved
on the same Uay and $900.00 per annum, prorata, of T's salary was
accordingly to be paid out of said federal funds. The auditor contends
that because of the above parenthetical clause, T could only draw
$3,100 out of the State appropriations.
HELD:
1. Where statutes must be considered in panl materia,
apparent inconsistencies must, if possible, be reconciled.
2. The Board had full power to fix T's salary.
3.
The parenthetical provision is clear "as the noon-day sun",
and is not void on the ground of ambiguity and unintelligibility.
4. The act is not unconstitutional on the ground that it is an
appropriation bill which fixes a salary since the clause is merely a simple
condition attached to an appropriation which may reduce but cannot
increase the sum.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Young and Mr.
Justice Knous dissent. Mr. Justice Bock not participating. EN BANC.
FOREIGN

JUDGMENTS

-

PROCESS -

JURISDICTION -

SERVICE

ON

AGENT-AGENCY-General Benefit Ass'n v. Bell-No. 14447Decided October 16, 1939-District Court of Denver-Hon.
Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. Where suit is brought in Colorado on a judgment
obtained in Missouri, the question of proper service of process in original
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suit (and jurisdiction over the defendant in personam) may be raised.
2. Where it appears that a Missouri beneficiary of a Colorado
non-profit benefit association caused process to be served in Missouri
upon a former solicitor for the association, but who had not sold any
certificates for the company for three years, and had been dropped by
the association as a solicitor over a year before service of process, and
where it appears that said purported agent told the sheriff that he was
not an agent of the company and hadn't been for some time prior to
sheriff's leaving of the summons with him, such service is not valid.
3. The agent upon whom process is served must occupy that
relation to the corporation at the time of service.
4. The service of process is jurisdictional and the return made
by the sheriff is not conclusive.
5. Service of process upon an agent for a foreign corporation
doing business within the state must be upon an agent representing
the corporation with respect to such business. It may not be upon
a mere servant or employee whose authority and duties are limited to
a particular transaction. There was no "fair and reasonable inference
of a duty" on the agent to communicate the fact of service upon him to
the company.
6. It is not necessary that the agent have express authority to receive process, but his relationship with the company must be of such
representative capacity that it would be fair to say that the delivery of
the summons to him constituted a valid service of process.
7. An agency, once existing, is presumed to have continued, in
absence of any thing to show its termination, unless such a length of
time has elapsed as destroys the presumption.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. EN BANC.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-INSTRUCTIONS-PENALTY-Leopold V.
People-No. 14603-Decided October 16, 1939-District Court
of Denver-Hon. Robert W. Steele, Judge-Affirmed.
1. Instructions considered, and the use of the word
HELD:
"homicide" rather than "murder" found to be proper.
2. A homicide is the killing of a human being by another, and
may be justifiable, and therefore, not unlawful.
3. A tendered instruction (refused) was improper since the trial
court has no duty to, and should not, select the salient points in the
evidence, and specifically call them to the attention of the jurors.
4. Proof of specific intent is not a prerequisite to a conviction for
first degree murder where a homicide is committed in the perpetration of
a robbery.
5. An instruction which permits the jury unlimited consideration of defendant's intent in connection with fixing the penalty for the
crime, is patently favorable to the accused and he may not complain.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. EN BANC.

Phone KE. 0241
Prompt Service

U

WHEN YOU NEED
Books of Record
Minute Books
Stock Certificates
Loose Leaf Books
Office Supplies
Filing Equipment
Book Cases
Steel Shelving
Office Furniture
Picture Framing

THIS LABEL is your guarantee of the
best in underwear. Whether its Shirts
and Shorts or Union Suits, or even
Heavy Winter Weights, you can get

COMPLETE
OFFICE OUTFIIERS

them at ....

A. GROSSMAN
CO&NER. 160I AND STOUT.f/

204 16th St.

Denver

V. J. POBRISLO
General Agent
708-10 RAILWAY EXCHANGE BUILDING

PHONE CHERRY 6521
DENVER, COLORADO
0

THE COLUMBIAN NATIONAL LIFE
INSURANCE CO.
BOSTON, MASS.

Dicta Advertisers Merit Your Patronage

